By Gary Stanley Becker
ISBN-10: 0870142631
ISBN-13: 9780870142635
Read or Download Essays in the economics of crime and punishment (Human behavior and social institutions) PDF
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Extra resources for Essays in the economics of crime and punishment (Human behavior and social institutions)
Sample text
If a rich man purchases a car and a poor man steals one, the former is congratulated, while the latter is often sent to prison when apprehended. " Whether a punishment like imprisonment in lieu of a full fine for offenders lacking sufficient resources is "fair" depends, of course, on the 48. In one study, about half of those convicted of misdemeanors could not pay the fines (see President's Commission, 1967c. p. 148). 49. The "debtor prisons" of earlier centuries generally housed persons who could not repay loans.
Umber of offenses the cost of combating 0 must be less 1); the former could page "revenue," given the right-hand side of would be positive the loss is minimized figure 1), the optimal only exceed unity the usual equilibrium that the elasticity of tse average revenue is a change in p is less arginal revenue from (21) and (22) indicate the optimal value of €, nly if C,, were sufficiently Ld ferrers. 24 I indicated earlier that the actual p's andf's for major felonies in the United States generally seem to be in regions where the effect (measured by elasticity) of p on offenses exceeds that off, that is, where offenders are risk preferrers and "crime does not pay" (Smigel, 1965; Ehrlich, 1967).
If marginal harm always exceeded marginal gain, the optimum level would be presumed to be zero, and that would also be the implication of (24) when suitable inequality conditions were brought in. In other words, if the costs of apprehending, convicting, and punishing offenders were nil and if each offense caused more external harm than private gain, the social loss from offenses would be minimized by setting punishments high enough to eliminate all offenses. 35 npulsive and other "irraity whose price has risen narily prices do not affect C.
Essays in the economics of crime and punishment (Human behavior and social institutions) by Gary Stanley Becker
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